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Being an expert in the age of uncertainty: Climate scientists
should not be afraid of expressing assessments of both best
and worse case climate change risks
Arthur Petersen argues that climate scientists need to better convey uncertainties so that
policy-makers and the public can more readily grasp the full range of potential impacts of
climate change.
The scientists who have been charged with writ ing the next assessment report of  the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) should not be af raid of  expressing
their expert judgement in assessments of  potential f uture impacts of  climate change. As
this latest assessment round of  the IPCC is heading into its f inal year of  draf ting, the authors should be
reminded that they will best serve their readers by assessing both best-case and worst-case risks.
Although recent controversies about the IPCC have highlighted that its last assessment in 2007
overstated the rate of  melting of  the Himalayan glaciers and overemphasised in its summary the most
negative projected regional impacts of  global warming, it is less well appreciated that the report also
provided estimates of  some of  the most important f uture risks that many scientists think were too
conservative.
For example, the IPCC’s estimates in 2007 of  possible rises in global sea level by the end of  the century
neglected the possibility of  a rapid destabilisation of  the land-based ice sheets in West Antarctica and
Greenland, which could cause a much bigger increase.
The report openly acknowledged that this impact was excluded because current models of  ice sheets
cannot produce reliable projections. Yet it would have been f ar more helpf ul to policy-makers if  the
scientists had used their expert judgement to estimate how much more sea levels might rise than the 59
centimetres presented in the worst case scenario in the report.
Similarly, the climate models cited by the IPCC in estimates of  temperature change by the end of  the
century did not f ully take into account uncertainties in the relationship between the climate and the
Earth’s carbon cycle. And even though this shortcoming was openly acknowledged in the 2007
assessment, the researchers who prepared the report’s summary f or policy-makers did not attempt to
quantif y how it might af f ect f uture projections of  temperature.
As a result, policy-makers and the public are not being f ully inf ormed of  the worst potential
consequences of  climate change, because the scientists involved in producing IPCC assessments have
been reluctant to over-rule conservative estimates by computer models.
As I point out in my book ‘Simulating Nature: A Philosophical Study of  Computer-Simulation Uncertainties
and Their Role in Climate Science and Policy Advice’, this major problem has arisen partly because the
researchers who wrote the 2007 IPCC report were not given adequate guidance about how they should
convey uncertainties, f or instance in estimates of  f uture impacts.
To ensure that this mistake is not repeated, the authors of  the next assessment report, the f irst volume
of  which will be published next year, need to give clearer explanations of  the dif f erent sources of
uncertainty, as well as estimates of  their importance.
This means that they need to distinguish between uncertainty that can be quantif ied by a range, either
with statistics or based on ‘what if ’ assumptions, and uncertainty that cannot be quantif ied, due to
methodological unreliability, recognised ignorance, or value diversity in the practice of  climate science
(see my book).
Both qualitative and quantitative dimensions of  uncertainty should be addressed simultaneously when
assessing scientif ic knowledge about climate processes and their consequences.
The IPCC recognised this need and produced a new guidance note f or authors of  the next assessment
about how to treat uncertainties consistently. But while this may help researchers to communicate with
each other, it is not clear that it will help them to convey uncertainties more clearly to policy-makers.
Researchers used the new guidance on uncertainties to prepare the Summary f or Policy-Makers of  the
IPCC ‘Special Report on Managing the Risks of  Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate
Change Adaptation’.
They used the guidance note’s dif f erent scales to describe the quality of  evidence, the degree of
agreement between dif f erent sets of  evidence, and the overall conf idence in the summarising
statements. While this may have satisf ied the authors (and my own) desire to create a detailed taxonomy
of  uncertainty, I f ear that the resulting summary is a technical document that makes only qualitative
statements about potential f uture impacts.
For instance, in relation to sea level rise, the summary states:
“It is very likely that mean sea level rise will contribute to upward trends in extreme coastal
high water levels in the future. There is high confidence that locations currently experiencing
adverse impacts such as coastal erosion and inundation will continue to do so in the future
due to increasing sea levels, all other contributing factors being equal. The very likely
contribution of mean sea level rise to increased extreme coastal high water levels, coupled
with the likely increase in tropical cyclone maximum wind speed, is a specific issue for tropical
small island states.”
Governments (including the UK’s and my own government, of  the Netherlands) share responsibility f or
the quality of  the language used in the summary as they approved each line in a session of  the IPCC
behind closed doors last November.
Over the next two years, in the government review rounds of  the IPCC assessment reports, they have an
opportunity to of f er additional guidance to researchers about how to convey uncertainties in a way that
allows policy-makers and the public to more readily grasp the f ull range of  potential impacts of  climate
change.
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